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I. INTRODUCTION
The modem environmental movement is heir to the Enlightenment's sub-
stitution of science, broadly defined, for religion as the fundamental norm
for organizing society. There are, of course, important ethical, religious
and "spiritual" strands to modem environmentalism, but environmentalism
is primarily science-based. Environmentalism would not exist were it not
for the writings of scientists such as Aldo Leopold,' Rachael Carson,2 Rene
Dubos 3 and Paul Sears, 4 to name just a few. Environmental law is even
more indebted to science than the environmental movement. Science has
been seen both as the justification for environmental law and as the means
for fairly administering it.
Initially, environmentalism was built on a simple but radical principle:
let nature be. The hope was that science could point the way to measures
that would let nature co-exist with human exploitation. The modem recog-
nition of the complexity of nature and the need for active management has
made science even more important. Today, environmental law seeks to
find the perfect balance between preservation and exploitation.
Administration of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in the Klamath Ba-
sin illustrates the challenges of scientifically managing nature. A series of
science-based decisions are needed, from species listing to consultation on
federal actions. Those decisions carry substantial costs for the people who
share the landscape with protected species. Unless science can provide
some level of confidence that management actions are both necessary and
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effective, those decisions will be widely perceived as unfair. The key ques-
tion, not yet answered, is just how much confidence should be expected.
That science must play a role in natural resource management decisions
goes almost without saying. It is obvious that we cannot protect endan-
gered species unless we know something about their needs, that we cannot
rebuild depleted fisheries without some sense of their population dynamics,
and that we cannot sensibly decide whether and to what extent to log in our
national forests unless we know something about how that decision will
impact the physical and biotic environment. Not surprisingly, the law has
responded to the need for scientific input. A wealth of legislative and regu-
latory mandates require that environmental and natural resource manage-
ment agencies seek the advice of scientists, consider the best available sci-
entific information, or obtain outside scientific review of their decisions.
We think it fair to say that natural resource regulation is heavily "scien-
tized." By this we mean both that the current regulatory structure requires
the use of science in a wide range of decisions, and that decision makers
emphasize the role of science in those decisions. Nonetheless, critics on all
sides of the political spectrum claim to believe that regulatory decisions
remain insufficiently scientific. Critics equate scientific decision making
with an objective, rational, analytically rigorous approach. In contrast, they
assume that "political" decision making is subjective, emotional, and re-
sponsive to special interestsf5 They agree that decisions informed more by
science than politics will produce better regulatory outcomes.6 However, at
this point the consensus disappears. Critics sharply disagree about whether
regulators are plagued primarily by too little good information or too much
bad information.
There may well be points in the decision making process at which greater
objectivity would be desirable. As we argue in more detail below, how-
ever, science can never provide the perfect rationality we have been condi-
5. Some legal academics, particularly proponents of quantifiable decision making, have also
urged the need to make regulatory decisions, particularly those in the environmental realm, more scien-
tific. See e.g. E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science's Voice at EPA, 66 L. & Contemp. Probs. 45, 49
(Autumn 2003) ("there is currently too much politics and not enough science in our environmental
decisions").
6. Two reports issued within months of each other from very different political perspectives
illustrate this point. In July 2003, the conservative Hoover Institution published Politicizing Science:
The Alchemy of Policymaking (Michael Gough ed., Hoover Press 2003), a collection of essays, many
about environmental regulation, complaining that politics was overriding science to produce rampant
unnecessary environmental regulation. The next month, Representative Henry Waxman, a liberal De-
mocrat, released a report asserting that the George W. Bush administration had sacrificed scientific
integrity at federal agencies in order to further its conservative agenda. U.S H. Comm. on Govt. Reform
- Minority Staff Special Investigations Div., Politics and Science in the Bush Administration,
http://democrats.reform.house. gov/features/politics-and_science/pdfs/pdLpolitics-and_sciencerep.pdf
(Nov. 13, 2003). Early in 2004, the Union of Concerned Scientists weighed in with its own report
charging the Bush administration with manipulating, distorting, and suppressing science on an unprece-
dented scale. Union of Concerned Scientists, Scientific Integrity in Policymaking: An Investigation into
the Bush Administration's Misuse of Science, http://www.ucsusa.org/global-environment/rsi/
page.cfm?pagelD= 1642 (March 2004).
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tioned to expect from it. Therefore, simplistic generalized demands for
objective rationality are not a useful reform strategy. Typically, the dis-
putes are fundamentally about how incomplete data are interpreted and ap-
plied, rather than about what the data are or how they have been gathered.
Agency judgments, in other words, are the real issue. It is impossible to
entirely prevent the influence of the decision maker's subjective values and
biases from creeping into decisions. A more useful inquiry would take a
closer look at the role of judgment, asking at what stage and through what
mechanisms judgment factors into resource management decisions; whether
the effect of that judgment process is to advance or retard the identification
and achievement of societal goals; and, when correction is needed, how
judgments might be more closely constrained.
II. WHAT SCIENCE-BASED DECISION MAKING IS INTENDED TO ACHIEVE
Before considering whether the use of science in resource management
decisions requires reform, and if so in what guise, it is worth examining
more closely what benefits science is supposed to bring. Science mandates,
in their various forms, are expected to serve several distinct goals.
First, science is supposed to help society achieve exogenously-
determined substantive goals by ensuring that the most precise and accurate
information available is factored into decisions. For example, before har-
vest of marine mammals may be authorized under the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (MMPA), the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS,
also known as NOAA Fisheries) must find, on the basis of the best scien-
tific evidence available, that the permitted harvest is consistent with "sound
principles of resource protection and conservation" and "will not be to the
disadvantage" of the stock in question.7 Science is invoked to help assure
that the substantive conservation goals of the Act, primarily maintenance of
stocks at the optimum sustainable population level,8 are met.
Second, science is expected to clarify highly general goals in specific
contexts, or to strike a viable balance between conflicting goals. Again the
MMPA provides an example. Optimum sustainable population is defined
as the population level that will provide the greatest productivity for har-
vest, consistent with the health of the ecosystem. 9 That goal is a compro-
mise between exploitation and protection; science is expected to identify
the point at which society can have its cake while eating as much of it as
possible. Similarly, under the ESA, federal agencies must ensure, using the
best scientific data available, that their actions will not jeopardize the con-
tinued existence of a listed species.'0 But if, in the course of the consulta-
7. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371(a)(3)(a), 1373(a) (2000).
8. 16U.S.C. § 1361(2) (2000).
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(9) (2000).
10. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
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tion process through which this obligation is implemented, the regulatory
agency determines that the proposed action will cause jeopardy, it must
recommend reasonable and prudent alternatives that won't jeopardize the
listed species." These statutory requirements assume that science can find
a perfect balance point, allowing extraction and development precisely up-
to the point at which they become inconsistent with conservation. In this
paradigm, science justifies regulatory restrictions that impose substantial
economic impacts on individuals and communities dependent on resource
exploitation by showing those restrictions to be necessary and effective.
Third, science mandates might be intended to constrain the exercise of
discretion by agencies that are no longer automatically trusted to pursue the
public interest. As Justice Scalia put it in Bennett v. Spear:
The obvious purpose of the requirement that each agency
"use the best scientific and commercial data available" is to
ensure that the ESA not be implemented haphazardly, on
the basis of speculation or surmise. While this no doubt
serves to advance the ESA's overall goal of species preser-
vation, we think it readily apparent that another objective
(if not indeed the primary one) is to avoid needless eco-
nomic dislocation produced by agency officials zealously
but unintelligently pursuing their environmental objec-
tives.1
2
When the science mandates of the ESA and other conservation laws were
first put in place in the early 1970s, they might reasonably have been seen
as needed to increase judicial oversight, because judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) at that time was extraordinarily defer-
ential to agency decisions. 3 Today, however, ordinary APA review re-
quires that agencies provide some scientific justification for highly techni-
cal decisions even in the absence of any explicit legislative science man-
date. It is not clear that science mandates add any additional constraint.
1 4
Science mandates do help to limit the influence of forbidden considera-
tions in regulatory decisions, in a way that the APA's limits on arbitrary
and capricious decisions do not. For example, in response to the Reagan
administration's refusal to add species to the protected list, the ESA was
amended in 1982 to require that listing decisions rest solely on the best sci-
11. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
12. 520 U.S. 154, 176-77 (1997). We do not endorse Justice Scalia's exercise in statutory interpre-
tation, which ignores both the ESA's overriding conservation purpose and the specific history of its
science requirements. See generally Wiliam Wr. Buzbee, Expanding the Zone, Tilting the Field. Zone
of Interests and Article III Standing Analysis After Bennett v. Spear, 49 Admin. L. Rev. 763, 785-86
(1997) (commenting on Justice Scalia's lack of textual support for interjecting economic concerns).
13. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 505, 532 (1985).
14. Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act's Best
Available Science Mandate, 34 Envtl. L. 397, 423 (2004).
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entific data available.1 5 That change was intended to prevent the regulatory
agencies from deciding not to list species based on concerns about the eco-
nomic costs of conservation. 6 While no one believes the change has en-
tirely kept costs out of the implicit regulatory analysis, at least it foreclosed
open reliance on costs as a basis for refusing to list.
A science mandate need not be as explicit as the ESA's listing provision
to have this effect. It may be enough that the decision to be made is clearly
a scientific one. For example, under a statute conditioning tuna imports on
the Secretary of Commerce finding that the practice of setting nets based on
the presence of dolphins was not having a significant adverse effect on dol-
phin populations in eastern Pacific tuna fisheries, a federal court recently
held that the Secretary could not consider the impact of the decision on
trade or international relations. 17  The court effectively reversed the
agency's decision that there was no significant effect, because the evidence
suggested that conclusion was based more on concerns about foreign rela-
tions than on the available scientific evidence. 1
8
Finally, it is often hoped that requiring agencies to base their regulatory
decisions on science will tone down intense conflicts over the allocation of
scarce natural resources. For example, the CALFED Bay-Delta Authority,
created by agreement between California and the federal government in the
late 1990s, strongly emphasized credible scientific analysis independent of
regulatory decision making, as well as ongoing oversight by distinguished
outside scientists.' 9 CALFED was intended to resolve the bitter conflicts
between the state and federal governments, water users and environmental
groups, and among competing water users, that had long paralyzed efforts
to address the environmental problems plaguing the San Francisco Bay-
Delta. 20 A strong science program was seen as an essential element of the
program; the expectation was that more complete, transparent, and credible
scientific information would defuse some of the controversy. 21 Emphasis
on science in decision making, however, and even increased information, if
decoupled from increased understanding, can exacerbate controversy by
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2000).
16. Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science
Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 1029, 1055 (1997); H.R. Conf. Rpt. 97-835, at 20 (Sept.
17, 1982); H.R. Rpt. 97-567, at 20 (May 17, 1982).
17. Earth Island Inst. v. Evans, No. C 03-0007 TEH, slip op. at 26-30 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 9, 2004).
18. Id. at 32.
19. See CALFED Bay-Delta Program, Programmatic Record of Decision, 74-76,
http://calwater.ca.gov/Archives/GeneralArchive/rod/ROD8-28-00.pdf (Aug 28, 2000).
20. For descriptions of background on CALFED and the difficult and protracted negotiations that
gave birth to the program, see Patrick Wright, Fixing the Delta: The CALFED Bay-Delta Program and
Water Policy Under the Davis Administration, 31 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 331 (2001); Elizabeth Ann
Rieke, The Bay-Delta Accord: A Stride Toward Sustainability, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 341 (1996); A. Dan
Tarlock, Federalism Without Preemption: A Case Study in Bioregionalism, 27 P. L. J. 1629, 1643-44
(1996).
21. See Katharine L. Jacobs, Samuel N. Luoma, & Kim A. Taylor, CALFED: An Experiment in
Science and Decisionmaking, 2003 Environment 30, 30, 36 (Jan.-Feb.).
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making it easier for people on all sides of the dispute to selectively rein-
force their beliefs.22 Furthermore, it is easy to oversell the value of science
in calming controversy. Most of the conflicts over natural resource man-
agement boil down to disagreements about values and priorities. Unless
scientific information reveals that all competing goals can be achieved, it• 23
will not solve these underlying conflicts.
i. THE INEVITABILITY OF JUDGMENT IN REGULATORY DEcisiON MAKING
Simple science mandates - directives that agencies use the best available
scientific data, consult with scientists in formulating decisions, and seek
review of data by outside scientists - could ensure accurate decisions,
closely constrain agency discretion, and defuse controversy if: (1) the
available scientific data were reliably complete, precise, and relevant to the
decision (or could be made so within the time frame allowed for decision
making); and (2) agency decision makers could be relied upon to strike the
same balance between competing goals as the larger society would. Unfor-
tunately, neither of these conditions is routinely satisfied.
The hard reality is that the scientific infrmawio a'ailable tW suppt en-
vironmental and natural resource policy decisions is frequently incomplete,
ambiguous, and contested. An array of critical interpretive judgments, not
fully determined by the data, are needed to translate that kind of science
into policy. The Klamath Basin water conflict 24 illustrates the inevitable
role of judgment in natural resource regulation.
A. The Klamath Basin Water Conflict
The Klamath Basin, straddling the Oregon-California border, contains
two distinctly different parts. The inland Upper Basin is high, flat, and arid,
with a climate similar to the Great Basin. Near the coast, the Lower Basin
is characterized by steep mountains and abundant rainfall. Until white set-
tlement of the area in the late 19th century, the Upper Basin landscape was
a system of interconnected shallow wetlands - the Everglades of the west.
The vast majority of those wetlands were drained early in the 20th century
for conversion to agriculture. The federal Klamath Project, operated by the
Bureau of Reclamation, irrigates the highest-value farm land in the Upper
Basin. The major natural waterbody in the Upper Basin, Upper Klamath
Lake, serves as the primary storage reservoir for the Project. Upper
Klamath Lake is extensive but very shallow, averaging only eight feet deep.
It cannot store enough water to carry over from year to year, As a result,
22. Daniel Sarewitz, How Science Makes Environmental Controversies Worse, 7 Envtl. Sci. &
Policy 385 (2004).
23. See id. at 386.
24. For a detailed description of this conflict, see Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms,
and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath Basin, 30 Ecology L.Q. 279 (2003).
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Klamath Project water supplies are always at the mercy of the highly vari-
able annual precipitation.
Three species of fish in the Klamath Basin are protected by the ESA: the
Lost River and shortnose suckers, which inhabit Upper Klamath Lake and
other water bodies of the Upper Basin; and the Southern Oregon / Northern
California coastal coho salmon, which range up the Klamath River and its
tributaries as far as Iron Gate Dam, the unofficial dividing point between
the Upper and Lower Basins. The ESA requires that all federal agencies
ensure that their actions do not jeopardize the continued existence of listed
species. 25 With listed species both in the Upper and Lower Basins, the Bu-
reau of Reclamation for the first time had to consider subordinating irriga-
tion deliveries in favor of species conservation. Its decisions were made
through a prescribed process of consultation with two wildlife agencies: the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), which is responsible for the endan-
gered suckers; and NOAA Fisheries (also known as the National Marine
Fisheries Service), which oversees the threatened coho salmon. The action
agency provides the wildlife agencies with a "biological assessment," its
written evaluation of the effects of its action on listed species. 26 After re-
viewing that assessment, the wildlife agencies issue a "biological opinion"
concluding whether or not the proposed action violates the prohibition on
jeopardy. If they render a jeopardy finding, the wildlife agencies must sug-
gest "reasonable and prudent alternatives" consistent with the proposed
action and within the action agency's authority, that will not cause jeop-
ardy.27 The action agency ultimately makes the decision whether or not to
proceed with the action, and in what form. However, if it proceeds in the
face of a jeopardy opinion it can expect, at least, skeptical review from the
courts .2 8
In 2001, a drought intensified competition for the Klamath Basin's lim-
ited water resources. The Bureau prepared a biological assessment calling
for maintaining distribution of water to farmers, at the cost of reducing wa-
ter levels in Upper Klamath Lake and in-stream flows in the Klamath River
below those at which the Project had traditionally been operated. FWS
found that the Bureau's proposal would jeopardize the listed suckers. In
order to protect them, it called for maintaining higher water levels in Upper
Klamath Lake. NOAA Fisheries concluded that the coho would also be
jeopardized by the Bureaus's proposal; it prescribed higher seasonal flows
in the Klamath mainstem than the Bureau proposed. Although it did not
concede that the wildlife agencies' analyses were correct, the Bureau be-
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1536ta)(2).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3) (2004).
28. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997) (explaining that a biological opinion "theoreti-
cally serves an 'advisory function,"' but actually has a powerful coercive effect because it will influence
reviewing courts).
20051
PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW
lieved it was effectively bound by the two biological opinions. Conse-
quently, there would be no water available from Upper Klamath Lake for
project irrigators. For the first time, the head gates of a federal irrigation
project were closed in order to protect fish.
The resulting outcry focused on the extent of scientific support for the
biological opinions. The Bush administration sought review of the science
by the National Research Council (NRC), the policy advice arm of the in-
dependent National Academies. The NRC follo-wed its usual piocedure,
appointing a committee of experts from a variety of disciplines to spend
several months reviewing the Klamath biological opinions. The commit-
tee's preliminary report concluded, in terms far less nuanced than most
NRC reports, that there was "no substantial scientific foundation" for either
FWS' demands for higher lake levels or NOAA Fisheries' demands for
higher river flows.2 9 The committee also noted that there was no substantial
scientific support for the Bureau of Reclamation's proposal to reduce lake
levels and instream flows.3" Subsequently, in a much more detailed final
report, the committee reiterated and expanded upon its conclusions. 3' Be-
cause the Klamath conflict has been used by critics of the ESA to argue that
regulatory decisions are not sufficiently scientific,32 it makes a useful ex-
ample of the inevitable role of non-scientific judgments in the regulatory
process.
B. A Taxonomy of Judgment in the Regulatory Process
The Klamath conflict illustrates the three types of judgment needed to
translate scientific data into regulatory decisions: scientific, management,
and policy. It also vividly demonstrates that typically natural resource con-
flicts are fundamentally about the judgments applied to the existing scien-
tific data, rather than about the data themselves or the methods by which
they are derived.
1. Scientific Judgments
The scientific process is an extraordinarily powerful method of generat-
ing reliable, objective information about the natural world over time. Sci-
entists gather data through observation or experimentation. They then
29. Nati. Research Council Comm. on Endangered and Threatened Fishes in the Klamath River
Basin, Scientific Evaluation of Biological Opinions on Endangered and Threatened Fishes in the
Klamath River Basin Interim Report 4 (Natl. Acad. Press 2002).
30. Id.
31. Natl. Research Council Comm. On Endangered and Threatened Fishes in the Klamath River
Basr n, Endangered and Threatened Fishes in the Klamath River Basin: Causes of Decline and Strate-
gies for Recovery (Natl. Acad. Press 2004) [hereinafter Final NRC Report].
32. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, House Panel Approves Species Act Changes, Wash. Post A19 (July
22, 2004) (discussing legislator's arguments for three-member panel approval of any agency decision
under the ESA); Natalie M. Henry, Walden to Tout ESA Reform at Klamath Basin Field Hearing, Env.
& Energy Daily, http://www.eenews.net/EEDaily/Backissues/071604/071604d.htm (July 16,2004)
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communicate their results and methodology to the relevant scientific com-
munity. This process allows other scientists to scrutinize data and repeat
experiments in order to refute or support the observations. As observations
accumulate, this process builds a tentative consensus in the scientific com-
munity. Eventually, with sufficient levels of research producing consistent
results, this tentative consensus can mature into confidence among scien-
tists that they understand how parts of the natural world work.
Judgment is an inherent aspect of the scientific research process. In the
early stages or at the frontiers of knowledge, science is a messy process
characterized by competing explanations. Research scientists must con-
stantly exercise judgment in deciding what to test, what explanations to
accept, and which data to prefer when some are consistent with their pre-
ferred explanation and others are not.
Scientific judgments are closely intertwined with judgments about the
desirability of avoiding different types of error, which are not "scientific" at
all. Research scientists in many fields, by convention, do not claim that
they have "proven" their point unless the data meet a specific level of statis-
tical significance, providing 95% confidence that their observations are not
attributable to chance alone. There is nothing magic about that confidence
level. It has become customary because it serves the goals of research sci-
ence. It keeps scientists in the field from prematurely accepting a hypothe-
sis as proven and moving on, likely down an unproductive research path.
But, as Professor McGarity so aptly put it twenty-five years ago, "statistical
significance is an issue of pure policy." 33 Furthermore, scientific conven-
tions about statistical significance have limited force; they only foreclose
claims of proof on the basis of single studies. They do not prevent scien-
tists from believing a connection is real on the basis of far less conclusive
evidence, or from acting on that belief in, for example, choosing their next
research project. Nor do they prevent an accumulation of studies, each of
which falls short of statistical significance, from being taken as a whole to
prove the connection. 34 Even without additional studies, a persuasive ex-
planation of the relationship between an alleged cause and effect may lead
scientists to accept its existence without strong data.
An additional scientific judgment step, beyond those inherent in the re-
search process, is often required when research science is applied to re-
source management. Much of the ecological research which forms the fun-
damental basis for resource management efforts is conducted by academics,
and funded by general research programs. Not surprisingly, academic re-
searchers focus on locations and systems that are convenient to study and fit
their research goals. Those are not necessarily the same systems that re-
33. Thomas 0. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of
Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 Geo. L.J. 729, 748 (1979).
34. See Doremus, supra n., at 1070-7 1, and sources cited therein.
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quire management. 35  Management controversies may bring targeted re-
search funding but quite often, especially early in the management cycle,
agency personnel must extrapolate results from small scale manipulation to
large scale management, or from one location, system, or species to a very
different one.36
The Klamath biological opinions required numerous scientific judg-
ments. Those most directly connected to the controversy were about the
effect of Water levels in Upper Kiamath Lake on the endangered suckers
and of flow levels in the mainstem Klamath River on the threatened coho
salmon. As is so often the case in natural resource management, those
judgments had to be made on the basis of very limited information.
Scientific interest in the suckers and salmon was not high until they were
listed under the Endangered Species Act. The earliest data correlating envi-
ronmental conditions with the status of the suckers, therefore, dated only to
1990. Even for that brief period, the available data were spotty and had not
been collected systematically. Thus when it produced its biological opinion
in 2001, FWS knew it was working with limited data. It had to decide
whether the operation of the Klamath Project, as proposed by the Bureau of
Reclamation, would impermissibly affect the suckers. Applying its estab-
lished interpretation of the ESA that the benefit of the doubt in section 7
consultation must go to the listed species,37 FWS called for lake levels to
remain higher than the Bureau proposed, and even higher than they had
been kept in recent dry years.
The NRC committee criticized the agency's scientific judgments, reason-
ing that the available data contradicted FWS' claim that low water levels in
Upper Klamath Lake might contribute to mass die-offs of adults or impede
juvenile recruitment, so that even a cautious interpretation of those data
could not support FWS' call for higher water levels. The committee's view
was surely a tenable one, but not incontestable. It is not always easy to tell
whether available data confirm or refute a particular hypothesis. The data,
limited as they were, showed that adult fish kills had occurred in years of
high, low, and average summer lake levels.38 That data straightforwardly
supports the NRC committee's interpretation that lake levels are not the
35. When Professor Tarlock taught at Indiana University, Bloomington, he was involved in coordi-
nating the University's response to a proposal by a public utility to run a power line through a Univer-
sity-owned hardwood forest. A young professor of biology offered to brief the Board of Trustees on the
adverse environmental impacts of power liOes, but he had to be dissuaded from talking about the inter-
ruption of mountain lion and grizzly bear migration patterns, since those species were not known to
exist in southern Indiana.
36. Gzyio L. BaskV'il~e, Advocacy, Science, Policy, and Life in the Real World, I Cmmratim
Ecology 9, http://www.consecol.org/volI/issI/art9/ (1997).
37. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. and Natl. Marine Fisheries Serv., Endangered Species Act Consul-
tation Handbook: Ps. for Conducting Section 7 Consultations and Confs. 1-6 (Mar. 1988) [hereinafter
Consultation Handbook].
38. Final NRC Report, supra n. 31, at 239.
[Vol. 26
NATURAL RESOURCE REGULATION
crucial factor in mass mortality events. 39 The picture is more complicated
with respect to the impacts of low spring lake levels on recruitment. Be-
cause lake levels are closely related to the availability of spawning habitat,
the NRC committee agreed that it was "a reasonable hypothesis" that lakeS40
levels might suppress spawning. 0 There was some data available to test
that hypothesis, but not very much. There were six years of data comparing
April lake levels with larval abundance, and relative abundance data for
eight older year classes in mass mortality events, which could be compared
with water levels when those fish were spawned.
The committee found the data suggested that any relationship between
lake levels and larval recruitment is weak or indirect.4 With respect to the
larval abundance data, the committee noted that measurements of larval
abundance had a high degree of sampling variance, so that it was difficult to
have confidence in the accuracy of any particular point.42 Five of six points
on the graph of spring water levels versus larval abundance suggested a
reasonably strong correlation between the two. Discounting the outlying
sixth point as either wrong (due to sampling error) or anomalous (due to the
chance variation allowed even by the most stringent statistical significance
tests) probably would have been within the bounds of accepted scientific
practice. As the committee pointed out, the conclusion that spawning suc-
cess is not related to the availability of spawning habitat "seems counterin-
tuitive. 43 The committee's interpretation that lake levels at the time of
spawning were not crucial to later population levels was bolstered by the
year class evidence from fish kills, which did not show a correlation with
mean water level during spawning.
The regulatory agencies and the NRC committee agreed that the avail-
able data did not conclusively prove or conclusively disprove the supposi-
tion that higher spring lake levels improved recruiting success. Scientific
judgments interpreting such limited and equivocal data reflect the educated
intuition of the scientists making them, but are also nearly inextricably
bound up with those scientists' views about the appropriate degree of risk
of ecological versus economic harm. Any judgment based on such a small
amount of data has a high probability of being wrong. There is some evi-
dence, though, that such judgments are less affected by subjective predic-
tions, such as policy preferences, if they are made with explicit considera-
tion of a model, even a crude one, of the system concerned."a
39. In its preliminary report, the NRC committee noted that there were no fish kills in low water
years in the 1990s. Natl. Research Council Comm. on Endangered and Threatened Fishes in the
Klamath River Basin, supra n. 29, at 18.
40. Final NRC Report, supra n. 31, at 225.
41. Id. at 226.
42. Id. at 225.
43. Id. at 226.
44. See Michael A. McCarthy et al., Comparing Predictions of Extinction Risk Using Models and
Subjective Judgment, 26 Acta Oecologia 67 (2004).
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2. Management Judgments
Management judgments are judgments about the amenability of various
aspects of a managed system to manipulation, and the likely response of the
system and the political community to the variety of possible perturbations.
Management decisions, such as choices of priorities among several possible
approaches to solving a problem, are necessarily made in light of those
judgments. Management judgments are frequently informed by, but hardly
ever wholly determined by, the available scientific evidence. There can be
a strong feedback loop; once management judgments are made, they can
strongly influence the collection and interpretation of scientific data, which
in turn can tend to entrench the original management decisions.
In the Klamath Basin, FWS and NMFS had to make management judg-
ments about where to focus their regulatory efforts. Both chose to focus
heavily on the Klamath Project, relying on the section 7 consultation proc-
ess to drive changes in Project operations. Other possibilities, including
section 9 enforcement proceedings against private irrigators who divert
water above Upper Klamath Lake,45 or section 7 consultation for other fed-
eral actions such as management of national forest lands in the Lower Ba-
sin, were essentially ignored. That choice drew considerable criticism in
the final NRC report,46 because the committee believed that regulation of
the Klamath Project alone would be both inequitable and ineffective.47
Before the committee issued its final report, we ourselves had called for a
broader approach to the Basin's problems.48
We remain persuaded that any lasting solution to the Klamath conflict
must extend beyond the boundaries of the Klamath Project. That does not,
however, mean that the regulatory agencies made improper, or even incor-
rect, management judgments. The rule of law requires that regulators en-
force applicable statutes, but those statutes often leave considerable imple-
mentation discretion. In deciding how to exercise that discretion, agencies
take into account both the accessibility to intervention and the leverage
provided by different parts of the system. In the Klamath situation, regula-
tors were entitled to consider that section 7 consultation proceedings, as
angry as they might make people, would almost certainly be less controver-
sial than section 9 enforcement. After all, section 7 operates through the
intermediary of another federal agency. When the section 7 process pro-
duced a judgment that the headgates at Upper Klamath Lake had to be
closed, that judgment was endorsed not only by the regulatory agencies, but
45. The Klamath Project irrigates only a fraction of the irrigated acreage in the Upper Basin.
Doremus and Tarlock, supra n. 24, at 345.
46. Final NRC Report, supra n. 31, at 323-339
47. See id. at 327-329.
48. Doremus & Tarlock, supra n. 24, at 343-49. The contours of this broader solution are beyond
the scope of this article. The necessary mind set is suggested in Ed Marston, Reclaiming the Spirit of
Reclamation, 44 Natl. Resources J. 681 (2004).
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also by the Bureau of Reclamation, an agency Project irrigators had every
reason to believe would give full consideration to their interests. Even so,
closure of the headgates produced a firestorm of outrage that reverberates
even today on the web and in the local community. A direct attack on irri-
gators above the Project through section 9 probably would have produced
an even more extreme reaction, likely including charges of black helicop-
ters.
The regulatory agencies also had reasonable grounds to believe that tar-
geting the Klamath Project would provide the greatest conservation return
on enforcement efforts. The Project, unlike private irrigators, has a direct
line to federal budget decisions. Its operation is the highest-profile ongoing
federal action in the Basin, and the one with the strongest local political
support. Reducing federal water deliveries was calculated to bring both
attention and a substantial infusion of federal conservation dollars to the
Basin. Indeed, the water crisis of 2001 appears to have had precisely that
effect. Congress and the Department of Interior have pumped money into a
new basin-wide restoration program being developed by the Bureau of Rec-
lamation. 49 Oregon and California have agreed to join the federal govern-
ment in a new cooperative approach to addressing the Basin's environ-
mental woes. 50 Even with the benefit of hindsight, it cannot be said that
regulators made a clear error in focusing their efforts on the Klamath Pro-
ject. They had every reason to suppose that the Project, the single largest
diverter in the system and a pipeline to federal funding, would provide the
most bang for the regulatory buck.
3. Policy Judgments
Policy judgments are judgments about social goals, the relative impor-
tance of those goals, and the importance of avoiding specific types of er-
rors. Choices about the extent of scientific certainty required to justify
regulatory action, for example, are policy judgments. By their very nature,
policy judgments cannot be made on any objective basis.
The sequence of regulatory events that produced the controversial bio-
logical opinions of 2001 included a number of policy judgments. Such
policy judgments logically precede, and provide the context for, the scien-
tific judgments. Congress has provided vague indications of how many of
these judgments should be made, but has generally left a broad space for
agency discretion. The regulatory agencies, in turn, frequently leave their
policy judgments unexplained, and even unacknowledged. Policy judg-
49. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Klamath Basin Area Office, Program Document Second Draft,
Klamath River Basin Conservation Implementation Program, http://www.usbr.gov/mp/kbao/CIP/
docs/CIP-ProgramDoc.pdf (Feb. 2004).
50. Klamath River Watershed Coordination Agreement, http://www.usbr.gov/mp/kbao/docs/CIP-
ProgramDoc.pdf (2004).
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ments essential to regulatory choices, therefore, often remain quite opaque
to the general public.
The first set of policy judgments in the Klamath sequence were those re-
quired in to list the suckers and salmon under the ESA. First, FWS and
NOAA Fisheries had to decide which fish to group together as "species."
The statute provides only that the term "species" includes subspecies and,
for vertebrates, "distinct population segments," a term not further defined.5'
Identifying groups for protection has been particularly challenging for Pa-
cific salmon. The genetic basis of much of the observed life history and
morphological variation in salmon is poorly understood. Within recognized
salmon species, runs are often largely, but not completely, reproductively
isolated from one another by the time and location of spawning.
In 1991, believing that runs should be protected if they represented a
unique evolutionary unit, NOAA Fisheries developed a policy for identify-
ing distinct population segments of salmon. 52 The policy provides for pro-
tection of groups that are "substantially reproductively isolated" from oth-
ers, so that they promise to evolve as a separate lineage,53and "represent an
important component in the evolutionary legacy of the species."'54 In 1995,
NOAA Fisheries identified the coho salmon stocks in the Rogue, Klamath,
Trinity, and Eel River basins, together with those in several smaller basins
in the same area, as a single distinct population segment.55  The agency
found a relatively large genetic distance between the northern and southern
fish in this Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU),56 and noted that fish from
this group were more likely to spend the ocean portion of their life cycle off
the California coast than their cousins from more northerly rivers.57 Neither
of these distinguishing traits amounted to a bright line. The recognized
ESU itself showed considerable genetic diversity,58 and the ocean distribu-
tions overlapped. 59 Faced with groups of fish that were not perfectly dis-
tinct from each other, genetically or in their ocean behavior, NOAA Fisher-
ies had to make judgments about where to draw lines. It might have ex-
cluded the Rogue River salmon from this group, or included those in the
Elk River to the south.60 Because nature itself has not provided bright lines,
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2000).
52. Policy on Applying the Definition of Species Under the Endangered Species Act to Pacific
Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 58612 (Nov. 20, 1991).
53. Id. at 58618.
54. Id.
55. Endangered and Threatened Species: Proposed Threatened Status for Three Contiguous ESUs
of Coho Salmon Ranging from Oregon Through Central Cal., 60 Fed. Reg. 38011, 38016 (July 25,
1995) (designating this distinct population as the "Southern Oregon/Northern California Coasts Coho
Salmon ESU").
56. Id. at38013.
57. Id. at 38014.
58. Id. at 38013.
59. Id. at 38014.
60. See id. at 38016 (noting that some genetic samples from the Rogue were similar to those from
Columbia River fish, and one sample from the Elk clustered with Umpqua River fish).
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any choice the agency made could be criticized as arbitrary. FWS provided
essentially no explanation for its particular choice, sticking with general
references to the genetic and ocean distribution patterns.
Once they had identified listable "species," FWS and NOAA Fisheries
had to make policy judgments about the degree of acceptable risk to those
species. The statute defines a species as "endangered" if it is "in danger of
extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range," 6' and "threat-
ened" if it is "likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future" 62 That
language makes it clear that endangered species must be in worse condition
than threatened ones, but can hardly be considered a definitive explanation
of the degree of risk needed to support listing in either category. The listing
agencies have not made any effort to describe in general terms what degree
of risk over what period of time they think makes a species endangered or
threatened. Their individual listing decisions frequently provide little in-
formation about the degree of risk facing the species, no doubt in part be-
cause robust estimates of the probability of extinction are unavailable. In
listing the coho salmon, NOAA Fisheries noted that the population had
dramatically declined from historic levels, although the Rogue River popu-
lation had recently bounced back a bit; that coho were absent from many
streams in the region that had once harbored them; and that a high propor-
tion of the naturally spawning fish in the region were first-generation
hatchery fish.63 In listing the suckers, FWS noted that the populations had
declined drastically (by as much as 50%) in the last several years, and that
no significant recruitment of young fish had been observed for 18 years.
64
Once the species were listed, and consultation had begun on the effects
of the Klamath Project, NMFS and FWS had to determine what level of risk
would fall below the jeopardy threshold and precisely what it means to "in-
sure" that jeopardy is "not likely. 65 The Services' joint regulations suggest
caution in this determination: "action[s] expected to ... reduce appreciably
the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the
wild" are considered to jeopardize the continued existence of the species.66
As with their listing determinations, the regulatory agencies did not clearly
address the extent to which they believed the Bureau's proposed operation
of the project would reduce the likelihood either of survival or of recovery
of the listed species.
As these examples should make clear, even with the best of intentions it
is very difficult to separate out the three different kinds of judgment. When
61. U.S.C. 1532(6).
62. U.S.C. 1532(20).
63. Endangered and Threatened Species: Threatened Status for Southern Or/Northern Cal. Coast
Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 24588, 24591 (May 6, 1997).
64. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Determination of Endangered Status for the
Shortnose Sucker and Lost River Sucker, 53 Fed. Reg. 27130, 27131 (July 18, 1988).
65. This is the operative language of ESA 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2).
66. C.F.R. 402.02.
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the Services opined that the Bureau's proposed operation of the Project
would cause jeopardy, they were necessarily making both scientific and
policy judgments. Undoubtedly those judgments were influenced by un-
stated management judgments about the reaction their decisions would pro-
voke.67 The NRC review committee may also have had a hard time separat-
ing out these distinct judgments. The committee was formally asked only
to review the science underlying the 2001 biological opinions. 68 The com-
mnittee read that charge (unnecessarily, in our view) as requiring that, in
deciding whether scientific evidence adequately supported the regulatory
requirements, it apply norms of research science that require high levels of
certainty to support a claim of "proof."69  In addition, the committee's
evaluation of the science may have been affected by its policy preferences.
The committee chair wrote that "it is obvious" that the regulatory agencies
will make professional judgments in a way that privileges the species they
are charged with protecting, but "[w]here the economic stakes are high,"
special attention should be given to the role of speculation in those deci-
sions.70  It seems that the committee chair, at least, believed that over-
regulation would generally be the norm,7' and that regulators would need to
be reined in when their zeal threatened to impose high economic costs on
society. That the committee as a whole may have shared this view is sup-
ported by its divergent treatment of the lake level and diversion point
screening requirements in the 2001 FWS biological opinion. The call for
higher lake levels was criticized because it lacked substantial scientific sup-
port. But the committee endorsed FWS' call to screen the main diversion
point from Upper Klamath Lake to the Project's irrigation works. The
committee acknowledged that the "benefits of this measure to the popula-
tion are unknown. 72 Presumably it believed this less controversial step,
which did not threaten to deprive farmers of their livelihood, required less
supporting evidence, If the committee was indeed inclined to demand
clearer scientific support for the biological opinions because of their per-
ceived economic consequences, that policy judgment may have affected its
scientific judgments.73
67. It is hardly surprising that FWS will not release jeopardy opinions (unlike no-jeopardy opin-
ions) without the signature of the regional director. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. and Natl. Marine Fisher-
iCs Serv. Consultation Handbook, supra n. 37, at 1-4 to 1-5.
68. Final NRC Report, supra n. 31, at 4.
69. Id. at314.
70. William M. Lewis, Jr., Klamath Basin Fishes: Argument is No Substitute for Evidence, 28(3)
Fisheries 20, 21 (Mar. 2003).
71. As explained below, the available empirical evidence is directly to the contrary. See infra nn.
9%-99 and accompanying lext.
72. NRC Final Report, supra n.31, at 237.
73. In fact that particular policy judgment, although tenable and perhaps even appealing on its face,
is rejected by the ESA, which establishes a uniform federal duty to avoid jeopardy and adverse modifi-
cation of critical habitat, independent of the economic benefits of the proposed action. 16 U.S.C. §
1536(a)(2).
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IV. CONTROLLING REGULATORY JUDGMENT
As these examples drawn from the Klamath conflict illustrate, the real
battleground in arguments about the use of science in natural resource regu-
lation is typically not the data themselves but the scientific, management,
and regulatory judgments used to interpret and translate the data into regu-
lations. Environmentalists calling for more or better science do so because
they think current science mandates have not done enough to achieve sub-
stantive conservation goals. Critics in the regulated community, by con-
trast, believe current science mandates have not done enough to protect
against unnecessary and unproductive regulation. Both sides claim to want
more science and less judgment, but a more accurate assessment is that both
want the inevitable judgments to be more closely aligned with their policy
preferences. The fundamental disagreement is over the appropriate burden
of proof. Environmentalists want regulatory agencies to be more cautious
about approving activities that may affect listed species, applying the pre-
cautionary principle to impose protective regulations even if the supporting
evidence is less than certain. The regulated community, on the other hand,
wants the agencies to be more cautious about imposing regulatory restric-
tions on their actions, and therefore calls for application of the very de-
manding standards of certainty imposed on claims of proof in the research
science community.7"
Both sides, however, tend to frame their arguments in the political arena
as calls for more scientific decision making, relying on a widespread mis-
perception (which they may share) that science can provide objective, per-
fectly rational, decisions. Both, therefore, end up promoting a debate about
"good" versus "bad" (or "sound" versus "junk") science. That debate,
which has taken on Miltonian proportions, is rooted in the endless and futile
search for a perfect world. The horror and brutality of the 20th century
destroyed the progressive vision of progress through science, reason and
technology. Chicago school economics destroyed the idea of an objective,
expert public interest. The Enlightenment idea that the physical sciences
can be the basis of perfect rationality, though, lives on. As John Passmore
observed, "the Enlighteners accepted the Socratic doctrine that vice is al-
ways a form of ignorance, that if man once learns what is best for him to
",75do, he will necessarily act in that way.
Proponents of science-based decision making on both the right and left
look to science to produce the perfect decision; apparently neither side will
accept less. Opponents of specific conservation actions want to know ex-
74. For a general explanation of these contrasting approaches to regulation, see J.B. Ruhl, The
Battle Over Endangered Species Act Methodology, 34 Envtl. L. 555 (2004). For a comparison of the
incentives and costs of error that might call for differing standards of proof in regulatory as opposed to
research science, see Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species
Act's Best Available Science Mandate, 34 Envtl. L. 397 (2004).
75. John Passmore, The Perfectibility of Man, 320 (Scribner's 1970).
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acty how many species or individual members of a protected species those
actions will save, while opponents of risk-based conservation decisions
want to know exactly how many will be killed.76 The search for scientific
perfection in this context, however, is misguided for two fundamental rea-
sons. First, as sensible ecologists have constantly warned, ecology and the
related biological sciences will never reach the precision and elegance of
physics and mathematics. Second, the search for the perfect science-based
decision deflects attention from the real issue, which is whether the decision
is legitimate. One of the strengths of the law is that it has never sought
perfection or even truth in the absolute sense, being satisfied with the more
attainable goal of legitimacy. The scientific attributes of reason and accu-
racy are necessary components of legitimacy, but we have only traditionally
expected that decision makers make a good faith effort to reach a justifiable
decision in light of available information. In the context of natural resource
regulation, the key legitimacy question is not whether the variety of judg-
ments that go into regulatory decisions are objectively correct or certain,
but whether they are adequately serving legitimately chosen societal goals.
A. Conventional Controls Do Not Closely Constrain Judgments
As we have seen, natural resource regulation and management decisions
are typically not closely constrained by the available data, because those
data are so incomplete and ambiguous. It is not surprising that people on
both sides of the political spectrum, distrusting the regulatory agencies,
want regulatory decisions to be more closely constrained. Indeed, the sci-
ence mandates that pepper conservation statutes were originally intended in
large part to increase agency accountability. In practice, however, they can
have precisely the opposite effect, insulating agency judgments from over-
sight by the courts and the political process.
Courts consider themselves ill-suited to intervene in the situations which
leave the greatest room for judgment: when agencies make decisions with a
highly technical content in the face of substantial uncertainty, Judges are
acutely aware that they lack specialized scientific expertise, and therefore
are not well qualified to oversee the exercise of scientific judgment.77 They
are also reluctant to impose limits on agency policy judgments where Con-
gress appears to have delegated to the agency responsibility for striking the
balance between competing policy goals.78
76. See generally Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059 (9th
Cir. 2004).
77. See Intl. Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650-51 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, 3,
concurring) ("Socrates said that wisdom is the recognition of how much one does not know. I may be
wise if that is wisdom, because I recognize that I do not know enough about dynamometer extrapola-
tions, deterioration factor adjustments, and the like to decide whether or not the government's approach
to these matters is statistically valid.").
78. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natl. Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
[Vol. 26
2005] NATURAL RESOURCE REGULATION
Natural resource regulatory decisions often share both of these attributes.
Courts therefore tend to approach them gingerly. Scientific judgments are
generally set aside only in the most egregious situations, as when it is clear
that there is a major inconsistency between the underlying information and
the ultimate conclusion. Federal agencies may not ignore a clear scientific
consensus, especially if their own experts agree with that consensus.
79
They may not entirely ignore relevant scientific information.80 Finally, they
must offer a coherent explanation of how their decisions rationally follow
from, or at least are consistent with, the available evidence.8' The policy
judgments that are necessarily implied or closely intertwined with scientific
judgments in natural resource regulatory decisions often go unrecognized,
or perhaps unacknowledged, by the courts.
Management judgments about which parts of a problem to tackle first,
and how fiercely, are also resistant to judicial review. The courts recognize
that agencies must enjoy enforcement discretion, as well as discretion to set
priorities on how to address multi-faceted problems. Holding otherwise
could allow multiple responsible parties to escape responsibility by pointing
fingers at others' contributions. So courts have ruled, for example, that
plaintiffs cannot challenge regulatory agencies' alleged failure to ade-
quately restrict fishing pressure, despite their mandate to protect salmon
habitat;82 and that species can be listed under the ESA without necessarily
showing that listing will ameliorate all threats.83 Agency predictions about
79. Examples include Northern Spotted Owl (Strix Occidentalis Caurina) v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp.
479, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (holding that FWS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to list the
northern spotted owl in the face of unanimous expert opinion, "including that of its own expert, that the
owl is facing extinction"); and Center for Biological Diversity v. Lohn, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1236-40
(W.D. Wash. 2003) (remanding decision not to list orca population because decision rested on assump-
tion that all orcas worldwide belong to the same taxon, an assumption the agency's scientific advisory
panel had unanimously rejected).
80. See, e.g., Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1454 (1988) ("In light of the ESA requirement
that the agencies use the best scientific and commercial data available to insure that protected species
are not jeopardized, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), the FWS cannot ignore available biological information,"
or refuse to use that information to develop projections about the impact of proposed actions on listed
species); San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Badgley, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1151 (E.D. Cal.
2000) ("there is no indication Defendants considered substantial evidence that suggests that the splittail
should not be listed, despite the significant contrary data and opinion" of the state fish and wildlife
agency).
81. See, e.g., Natl. Assn. of Home Builders v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
FWS inadequately explained its designation of Arizona population of cactus ferruginous pygmy owl as a
distinct population segment); Natl. Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 113 F.3d
1121, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that FWS had failed to adequately explain its conclusion that
designation of critical habitat would not be beneficial to the coastal California gnatcatcher); Am. Rivers
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 271 F. Supp. 2d 230, 255-57 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding that FWS had
failed to adequately explain why recent improvements in the condition of listed species justified "dra-
matic departure" from the conclusions of an earlier biological opinion); Am. Wildlands v. Norton, 193 F.
Supp. 2d 244, 254 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding that FWS had failed to offer "a scientifically based explana-
tion" for its decision to include hybrid fish in its assessment of the status of the westslope cutthroat
trout).
82. Common Sense Salmon Recovery v. Evans, 329 F. Supp. 2d 96, 102-05 (D.D.C. 2004).
83. City of Las Vegas v. Lujan, 891 F.2d 927, 934 (DC Cir. 1989).
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the response of both natural and social systems to management measures
also tend to get considerable deference. 84
The political process does affect agency judgments, but not in a way that
is likely to accurately reflect societal goals. Although conservation statutes
generally provide opportunities for public input, it is extraordinarily diffi-
cult for the lay public to play an effective role in shaping highly technical
regulatory decisions. 85 The barriers to participation are exacerbated by the
tendency of agencies to hide the policy judgments they make behind the
scientific ones. Those decisions may be difficult to recognize, let alone
challenge.86 The Klamath conflict is a good example. Few members of the
public are likely to have the expertise, or the patience, to grapple with the
details of the available evidence concerning the relationship between lake
levels and sucker well-being.
That highly technical regulatory judgments are not accessible to the gen-
eral public does not make them immune to political pressures. Instead, it
skews those pressures. Only the best-funded interests, which are not likely
to favor conservation, will be effectively represented in regulatory proceed-
ings that turn on those sorts of issues.87 Moreover, the opacity of technical
decisions can allow agencies to hide their political choices from the view of
courts or voters. The technical nature of natural resource regulatory deci-
sions, therefore, can actually undermine the ability of courts and the public
to hold agencies to the mandates articulated by Congress.88
B. Do Regulatory Judgments Fit Societal Goals?
That natural resource regulatory decisions involve a substantial r- ... e
of judgment, and that the exercise of that judgment is not likely to be
closely overseen by courts or voters, are not causes for concern in and of
themselves. Those aspects of regulatory decisionmaking are worrisome
only if and to the extent that agency judgments in practice ran counte tio
societal goals reflected in legislation. Our analysis here is intentionally
84. In Natl. Wildlife Fedn. v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1298 (E.D. Cal. 2000), plaintiffs
challenged the issuance of an Incidental Talce Permit based on a habitat conservation plan for the Nato-
mas Basin just outside of Sacramento. Plaintiffs challenged, among other things, FWS' projection
(speculation) that only a fraction of the basin's acreage would be developed over the life of the permit,
and the consequent conclusion that a combination of purchased reserves and continued agricultural use
would be sufficient to protect the covered species. The court found that the agency's judgments were
within its discretion because they concerned "the uncertainties inherent in the market-based mitigation
mechanism employed by the HCP," and were an inevitable aspect of the complicated decisionmaking
implicit in the permit process.
85. Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1613,
1674-77 (1995).
86. See id. at 1627-28.
87. See id. at 1677.
88. Even individual legislators, particularly those with powerful committee positions, can exert
political pressures that push the agencies toward actions inconsistent with the intent of seemingly clear
statutes like the ESA. See generally J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to
Control Delegated Power, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1443 (2003).
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descriptive, rather than normative. We believe it is possible to roughly
identify the trade-offs Congress directed the regulatory agencies to make,
and that the degree of correspondence between agency decisions and that
direction is a legitimate test of whether agency judgments are being made
appropriately.
Federal natural resource laws often have multiple, even competing goals.
Essentially, though, the modern statutes embody a commitment to give the
environment more weight than it traditionally had been given when in con-
flict with extractive or development interests. They were adopted when it
became clear that pursuing economic goals without adequate attention to
the environment was causing serious environmental degradation. They
exist to counteract what would otherwise be unopposed economic pres-
sures. 89 Their science mandates were primarily intended to serve that goal
by limiting the role of economic and political pressures in the regulatory
process.
The ESA, source of the most frequent and intense controversies over
natural resource management in the United States, is perhaps the clearest
example. It was enacted in 1973 specifically because earlier, less strongly
regulatory, federal statutes had failed to stem the tide of extinctions.D Its
regulatory provisions are supported by an explicit Congressional finding
that "various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have
been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and develop-
ment untempered by adequate concern and conservation." 9 The first time
the Supreme Court encountered the ESA, it famously described the law as
giving endangered species "the highest of priorities'92 and requiring their
protection "whatever the cost." 93 The law has since been amended so that it
is no longer so single-minded. It now allows development so long as it that
development is compatible with conservation, 94 and provides a narrow ex-
emption procedure if, after a trial-type hearing, a cabinet-level committee
finds that the benefits of a project clearly outweigh those of any alternative
89. In the 1960s, the environmental movement aggressively used benefit-cost analysis to criticize
public works projects as inefficient. During the Kennedy-Johnson administrations, benefit-cost analysis
was enthusiastically embraced by many progressives as a way to rationalize everything from military
spending to environmental regulation. However, environmentalists soon bristled at efforts to subject the
protection of remote public risks to benefit-cost analysis, especially as lives saved became the measure
of benefits. More and more, environmentalists embraced precaution as a separate decision criterion and,
with some important exceptions, benefit-cost analysis has become associated with efforts to undermine
environmental regulation. For a recent criticism of the use of benefit-analysis to undermine risk-based
regulation intended to protect future generations see Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On
Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing (The New Press 2004).
90. Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 18
Ecology L.Q. 265 (1991).
91. U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2000).
92. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
93. Id. at 184.
94. U.S.C. § 1539(a)(i)(B) (2000); 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
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consistent with conservation. 95 Those changes have not altered the basic
ordering of priorities, however; the overriding goal of the law remains con-
servation in the face of development pressures.
This history explains why the ESA is not neutral about the use of a pre-
cautionary framework. It requires some degree of caution in -order to
achieve the overriding goal of conservation. That's why it requires that
decisions rest on the "best available science," instead of mandating some
specific threshold level of scientific support. That does not mean that spe-
cies cannot be subjected to any risk; the agencies retain significant discre-
tion as to how much risk is acceptable. But it does mean there has to be a
finger on the scale, of some indeterminate size, on the side of the species.
The regulatory agencies cannot, for example, require conclusive evidence
as a prerequisite to listing a species.96 It also means that, at a minimum, the
economic costs of protection cannot by themselves be the basis of a less
protective stance unless the statutory exemption process is invoked or Con-
gress grants a legislative exemption. When the regulated community de-
mands "sounder science," it is trying to replace the current, vaguely precau-
tionary, direction of the statute with the very high threshold of certainty that
characterizes claims of "proof' in controlled research science.
Of course, without going to the extreme of requiring virtual certainty to
justify regulation, one could worry that the underspecified ESA directive to
use caution invites unnecessary over-regulation by a mission-driven regula-
tory agency. The chair of the Klamath NRC committee shared that con-
cern.97 On its face, that is a plausible initial assumption. The available
evidence, however, contradicts it. There is strong evidence that the regula-
tory agencies do not list species whose conservation predictably conflicts
with economic activities unless and until forced to do so by litigation.98
The evidence is less overwhelming with respect to section 7, perhaps be-
cause evaluation is more difficult. Nevertheless, it is clear that biological
opinions rarely find jeopardy; when they do, the regulatory agencies go out
of their way to devise reasonable and prudent alternatives that minimize the
regulatory burden. 99 In the Klamath context, for example, NMFS in its
95. U.S.C. § 1536(h).
96. Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 958 F. Supp. 670,679 (D.D.C. 1997).
97. See supra n. 31, at 354 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., DeShazo & Freeman, supra n. 88; Amy Whritenour Ando, Waiting to Be Protected
Under the Endangered Species Act: The Political Economy of Regulatory Delay, 42 J. L. & Econ. 29
(1999); Andrew Metrick & Martin L. Weitzman, Patterns of Behavior in Endangered Species Preserva-
tion, 72 Land Econ. 1 (1996); David S. Wilcove, Margaret McMillan, & Keith C. Winston, What Ex-
actly Is an Endangered Species? An Analysis of the U.S. Endangered Species List, 1985-1991, 7 Con-
servation Biology 87 (1993); U.S. General Accounting Office, Endangered Species: Factors Associated
with Delayed Listing Decisions (1993); Steven L. Yaffee, Prohibitive Policy: Implementing the Federal
Endangered Species Act (The MIT Press 1982); U.S. General Accounting Office, Endangered Species:
A Controversial Issue Needing Resolution (1979).
99. Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments
of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 277, 354 (1993).
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2002 biological opinion found that Project operations would jeopardize the
coho, but required only that the Bureau provide roughly half the water flow
NMFS thought the fish required in the mainstem Klamath.' 00 While the
regulatory agencies may well perceive conservation as their primary mis-
sion, they are clearly vulnerable to focused political pressure against con-
servation measures. In that broad sense, therefore, agency judgments ap-
pear to be less conservation-oriented than is called for by legislated societal
goals.
Furthermore, limitations in the available information can lead to inaccu-
racies in scientific judgments, which in turn can infect regulatory decisions.
Where that is the case, even if regulatory agencies summon the political
courage to mandate conservation measures, those measures might not prove
effective. That would obviously decrease the likelihood that societal con-
servation goals would be met. In addition, it would tend to erode political
support, as the regulated community's losses are not balanced by conserva-
tion benefits.
It is very difficult to evaluate the accuracy of regulatory decisions, but
we suspect that inadvertent inaccuracy is a far more common shortcoming
than conscious overregulation, which appears quite rare. Most outside
evaluations have given at least a qualified endorsement to the science be-
hind regulatory decisions.10 But several have noted how little information
is available, and few have tried to evaluate the likelihood of conservation
success. Data on the status of listed species show that many are not no-
ticeably improving.'0 2 That could simply confirm that the regulatory agen-
cies are too timid to require needed measures, it could reveal that the agen-
cies lack authority over important threats, or it could indicate that required
conservation measures are not working as expected.
100. Natil. Marine Fisheries Serv., Biological Opinion: Klamath Project Operations 57 (May 31,
2002). The justification for this limitation was that the Project should only have to provide additional
water in proportion to its withdrawals within the watershed. That portion of the 2002 Biological Opin-
ion was subsequently overturned by a reviewing court, because there was no assurance that the addi-
tional water necessary to assure salmon persistence would be forthcoming. Pac. Coast Fedn, of Fisher-
men's Assns. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, No. C 02-2006 SBA (July 15, 2003).
101. Independent peer reviews sought by the regulatory agencies for ESA listing decisions, critical
habitat designations, and recovery plans have almost always agreed with the agency decision. U.S.
General Accounting Office, Endangered Species: Fish and Wildlife Service Uses Best Available Science
to Make Listing Decisions, but Additional Guidance Needed for Critical Habitat Designations 21-22,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-803 (Aug. 2003). The regulatory agencies also fare well in
most NRC reviews. There have been at least six NRC reviews of specific ESA decisions. Only one, the
Klamath review, has disagreed fundamentally with the regulatory action taken.
102. FWS must report every two years on the status of all species listed under the ESA. The most
recent report shows 21% of listed species declining, 30% stable, and only 6% improving. The status of
39% of listed species is reported as "uncertain." U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Recovery Report to Con-
gress, Fiscal Years 2001-2002 16, http://endangered.fws.gov/recovery/reports-to-congress/2001-
2002/report_text.pdf (not dated),
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C. How Might Regulatory Judgments Be Tied More Closely to Societal
Goals?
In theory, Congress could readily solve the problem of regulatory agen-
cies enjoying too much discretion and failing to exercise that discretion
appropriately in the service of societal goals. The statutes could be
amended to be much more prescriptive. That has occurred in the pollution
context. For example, when EPA moved too slowly to regulate hazardous
air pollutants, Congress enacted a list of such pollutants and ordered EPA to
regulate them on a specific schedule. 0 3 Without getting quite that prescrip-
tive, Congress could be clearer about how agencies should treat uncertainty.
It has done that, for instance, in the Clean Air Act by requiring that EPA set
National Ambient Air Quality Standards that, "allowing an adequate margin
of safety, are requisite to protect the public health;"' 4 and in the Clean Wa-
ter Act's Total Maximum Daily Load provision, which directs EPA to set
TMDLs with "a margin of safety which takes into account any lack of
knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent limitations and
water quality."' 0 5
A legislative solution of this sort is not likely for the ESA, or for that
matter the federal land management statutes or other natural resource laws.
Lists are simply impractical. Numerical bounds, such as requirements that
species face a prescribed extinction risk before they can be listed, are not
useful in the face of very weak scientific information because extinction
probabilities cannot be calculated with any accuracy. Finally, Congress has
shown no interest in facing up to the political costs of making these choices
explicitly. It is more politically advantageous to declare aspirational goals
in ringing terms, but leave the implementing agencies with the hard task of
determining the extent to which those goals will be achieved.1
0 6
Without openly addressing the exercise of agency discretion, however,
Congress and the executive branch make numerous decisions that affect
that discretion. Making effective use of scientific information in policy
making is as much an institutional challenge as it is a scientific one. Deci-
sions about how to structure agencies, advisory committees, and interac-
tions with various constituencies, while indirect, may be the strongest tools
available for controlling agency judgments.
103. U.S.C. § 7412 (2000)
104. U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000)
105. U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2000)
106. See e.g. Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev.
181; William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Lesson of the Owl and the Crows: The Role of Deception in the Evo-
lution of the Environmental Statutes, 4 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 377 (1989).
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1. The Choice of Decision Maker
The first key choice is the assignment of decision making authority.
Regulatory outcomes may strongly depend upon which of two or more
competing agencies is delegated authority to determine what scientific in-
formation to collect, interpret, and apply. Even within a single agency, the
distribution of authority can be critical.
Most obviously, if conservation is the primary goal, decision making au-
thority must not rest with those whose economic interest depends upon de-
velopment or extractive activities. Even scientific judgments must be dis-
sociated from economic self-interest. Where the evidence is equivocal or
even short of overwhelming, people tend to interpret it as consistent with
their own interests. 10 7 Short-term self-interest can also drive management
and policy judgments in directions that systematically disfavor conserva-
tion, even in the face of an apparent long-term financial interest in conser-
vation.
A striking illustration comes from fisheries regulation in the United
States, where placing the power to make initial decisions on annual quotas
in the hands of the fishing industry, even subject to oversight by a regula-
tory agency, has been a conservation disaster. Under the Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, °8 regional Fishery
Management Councils propose annual quotas, on the basis of stock assess-
ments performed by NOAA scientists and reviewed by scientific advisory
bodies to the Councils.' 9 Council membership is dominated by commer-
cial and recreational fishing interests."1 Quotas must be based on the best
available scientific evidence."' They are supposed to prevent overfishing
or, in the case of already overfished stocks, provide for recovery to maxi-
mum sustainable yield. In two case studies, Eagle and Thompson found
that regulatory judgments contributed to significant overfishing. 12 In one
of their two case studies, the initial scientific assessments appeared to be
reasonably accurate, but the regional Council systematically proposed quo-
tas either above those recommended by the scientific advisory bodies or at
the very top of the range deemed scientifically plausible. In the other, the
scientists appear to have systematically overestimated the available catch,
107. See e.g. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. l. L. Rev.
299, 305; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Ration-
ality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1051, 1093 (2000).
108. U.S.C. §§ 1801 - 1883 (2000).
109. See Josh Eagle & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Answering Lord Perry's Question: Dissecting
Regulatory Overfishing, 46 Ocean & Coastal Mgmt. 649, 654-55 (2003).
110. Id.; Natl. Marine Fisheries Serv., 1999 Report to Congress on Apportionment of Membership
on the Regional Fishery Managertent Councils (2000).
111. U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2) (2000).
112. Eagle & Thompson, supra n. 109, 655.
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and in addition the Council exceeded their recommendatioins for several
years. 3
Financial conflicts are not the only source of biases that can skew regula-
tory judgments. Agency mission and culture can have a similar effect. It is
not surprising, for example, that FWS and the Bureau of Reclamation came
to very different conclusions about the needs of the endangered suckers in
the Klamath Basin based on the same underlying data. Experts are no more
immune to interpretive biases than lay persons."14 Recent news coverage of
the Food and Drug Administration's drug review process illustrates the
extent to which the perceived organizational mission can override individ-
ual views. A survey conducted by the Inspector General of the Department
of Health and Human Services found that nearly one in five FDA scientists
had felt pressured to recommend approval of a new drug against their own
best judgment.' '
The extent to which decisions are centralized or decentralized may also
be important, as may the geographic location of the office where decisions
are made. Greater decentralization is likely to weaken the extent of control
exercised by the political appointees at the top level of agency administra-
tion. Central political control will be especially difficult to maintain if
judgments are delegated to the field office level, where they will be made
by career employees rather than political appointees."1 6  The substantive
effect of such weakened control will depend, obviously, on both the views
of the administration and those of the local agency officials.
Where the field office is located in a resource-dependent community and
agency personnel tend to have long tenure in a single location, regulatory
judgments made by local career employees are likely to favor local inter-
ests. That is even more true if the agency views its mission as promoting or
113. Eagle and Thompson note in this case study that the Pacific Fishery Management Council
appeared to become more conservation oriented in the early 1990s. They do not offer an explanation for
the shift. Id. at 670.
114. See Natl. Research Council, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society
11-13 (Paul C. Stem & Harvey V. Fineberg, eds., Natl. Academy Press 1996); Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, in Judgment Under Uncer-
tainty: Heuristics and Biases 32, 46 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, Amos Tversky, eds., Cambridge U.
Press 1982), Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, in Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 48, 68 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, Amos Tversky, eds., Cam-
bridge U. Press 1982).
115. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., Office of Inspector General, FDA's Review Process for
New Drug Applications: A Management Review 12 http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-01-00590.pdf
(Mar. 2003).
116. The Army Corps of Engineers, for example, which administers the Clean Water Act's wetlands
filling permit provisions, is highly decentralized. A recent General Accounting Office study found that
district offices, which are responsible for most decisions to assert federal jurisdiction over wetlands,
interpreted the scope of federal jurisdiction very differently. General Accounting Office, Waters and
Wetlands: Corps of Engineers Needs to Evaluate Its District Office Practices in Determining Jurisdic-
tion, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO4297.pdf (Feb. 2004). The Bush administration has tried to exert
tighter control over decisions to regulate at the boundary of federal authority by issuing a memorandum
requiring that such decisions be elevated to Corps headquarters in D.C. Id. at 14 n. 14.
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supporting local industry. The Bureau of Reclamation, for example, in its
2001 biological assessment for operation of the Klamath Project, inter-
preted the scientific evidence to permit water deliveries to Project irrigators
that would reduce lake levels and river flows below historic minimums.
The Bureau has long perceived irrigators served by its projects as its clients,
and it works hard to satisfy their needs." 7 Compounding that mission ori-
entation, the biological assessment was drafted by the Klamath Falls office
that operates the Project. Bureau employees in Klamath Falls are likely to
be acutely aware of the social value of agriculture to the local community,
and have absorbed local beliefs about the economic value of agriculture.
By contrast, the FWS and NOAA Fisheries biological opinions, which
called for considerably lower deliveries to carry out their conservation mis-
sions, were prepared by employees based in Sacramento and Long Beach,
respectively. Those employees were insulated by both mission and distance
from the economic impacts of regulatory decisions on upper Basin agricul-
tural interests.
Finally, the training and professional identity of the individuals who
make judgments should be expected to play a role. In particular, the extent
to which decision makers are trained in the natural sciences, and identify
themselves as biologists, will likely play an important role in their scientific
and policy judgments. On the one hand, research scientists, those with doc-
toral degrees or equivalent professional research experience, are likely to
have strongly internalized research norms against prematurely asserting that
a connection has been established between a specific action and species
decline. That acculturation might work against conservation. On the other
hand, those scientists who study ecology, conservation biology, or an indi-
vidual endangered species tend to be unusually devoted to their work, and
intensely focused on the particular area or system which they choose to
study." 8 This absorption in their work tends to bring with it a correspond-
ingly intense interest in the long-term health of the environment in general
and their focal interests in particular. It may not be the norm for these sci-
entists to be politically active, but most of them share the view that conser-
vation is more important than economic development. 119 That view will
tend to push their judgments in a more protectionist direction.
We suspect that those scientists who choose to go into agency, rather
than academic, jobs, feel more strongly about protecting species, and less
strongly about the norms of academic science. Thus, we would expect sci-
117. See e.g. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109, 1127-28 (10th Cir. 2003), va-
cated, 355 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004) (Bureau argued that its irrigation contracts left no discretion, and
ktyefotre X'AS zOAO5is 'fWeve vnoi Si~bet1L 10-o £SA iv sXw
118. Gerald Holton, The Scientific Imagination 241 (2d ed., Harvard U. Press 1998).
119. Ecologists are more likely than the general public to assign intrinsic value to the natural world.
See Paul A. Sabatier & Matthew 7'afonte, The Views of Bay/Delta Water Policy Activists on Endangered
Species Issues, 2 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L. & Policy 131, 145 (1995); Ernst Mayr, Toward a New
Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an Evolutionist 89 (Harvard U. Press 1988).
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ence mandates, because they tend to strengthen the role of agency scientists
relative to other career employees and political appointees, to encourage
more strongly conservationist regulatory judgments. That effect should be
intensified by decision making structures that give agencies with a conser-
vation mission a strong role, such as the ESA's consultation procedures.
The Bush administration, which does not favor conservation, has made con-
siderable use of the converse approach. It has shifted decision making
power away from conservation agencies to agencies with extractive mis-
sions, and has also minimized the role of conservation scientists through
aggressive oversight by political appointees. 1
20
2. Tools for Increasing Transparency
We explained earlier that agency scientific, management, and policy
judgments may escape public oversight yet remain vulnerable to focused
political pressures, because they are hidden under a veneer of scientific
opacity and claims of objectivity. Any steps that make the various types of
judgment that go into regulatory decisions more openly apparent should
help balance the political scales. Transparency is, of course, not a panacea.
Disclosure does not solve, and can even exacerbate, political conflict. But
by revealing informational gaps and political judgments, it can focus the
debate, and potentially reveal an expanded menu of choices.
a. Demanding transparency through judicial review
Transparency is difficult to achieve, given that both Congress and the
agencies seem to believe that hiding their judgments is in their best political
interest, and that agencies fear that candor will increase their vulnerability
to judicial reversal. Courts could increase transparency by demanding
clearer explanations of the policy judgments that necessarily underlie regu-
latory decisions, and deferring to those judgments when they are explained.
For example, FWS and NOAA Fisheries have typically avoided explaining
what degree of risk they regard as unacceptable in ESA listing or consulta-
tion decisions . In their Section 7 Handbook, they explain their belief that
they must give the benefit of the doubt to the species when faced with data
gaps. 12 In individual decisions, they do not explain to what extent they
believe they are giving the benefit of the doubt to the species, or what un-
certainties prompt them to do so.
Couits, which seem quite prepared to demand careful, coherent explana-
tions of the scientific leaps that agencies make,122 could be equally demand-
ing with respect to policy judgments. Like the parents of teenagers, courts
120. See Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource Management in the Bush Ad-
ministration, __ Ecology L.Q. _ (forthcoming 2005).
121. Consultation Handbook, supra n. 67, at 1-6.
122. See supra n.79.
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should reinforce socially desirable behavior by rewarding candor and pun-
ishing secretiveness. Congress has done precisely that by mandating envi-
ronmental review of proposed federal actions under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act.'23 Where Congress has not directly demanded candor,
courts can and should take up the slack. One good example from the natu-
ral resources context is Fishermen's Dock Cooperative, Inc. v. Brown.124 A
coalition of commercial fishers challenged a quota for summer flounder set
by the Department of Commerce. A scientific advisory committee had se-
lected a quota one standard deviation below the mean estimated recruitment
over the previous five years. Plaintiffs claimed that the Magnuson Act's
requirement for use of the best scientific data available mandated that the
quota be set, instead, at the mean annual recruitment level.
The court disagreed. It noted that use of the best scientific data need not
mandate "one and only one possible quota."'' 25 Given the uncertainty of the
data, any specific quota could be attacked as arbitrary. Under the circum-
stances, the agency "necessarily had some discretion to decide what precise
degree of assurance it would seek within the uncertainty of the data."' 26 It
had explained why it chose the lower quota, essentially noting that its pri-
mary goal was to stay below the target mortality and that some assumptions
in the model it used could be optimistic.
The Fishermen's Dock decision is a good model in three respects. First,
the court recognized that the best available science frequently will not point
to a single, clearly identifiable management choice. Second, it realized that
the selection of a particular choice within the range identified by the avail-
able science depended upon value choices. Third, the court gave the
agency's decision greater deference because it had explained both the scien-
tific and value bases for the particular choice made. Courts should also take
the next step, remanding decisions where such transparency is lacking.
Courts should be on the lookout for (and litigants should point out) circum-
stances in which regulatory decisions necessarily involve value choices.
Agencies should have to explain those choices, with reference to their
goals, their understanding of the degree of uncertainty in the data, and the
extent to which they have employed a precautionary approach. At the same
time, courts need to rein in their own tendency to interfere with agency pol-
icy judgments within boundaries left open by the legislature. Agencies
must be assured that revealing their political choices will not undermine
their legal position. Instead of effectively pressuring agencies to engage in
a science charade, courts should provide incentives for the agencies to re-
veal their political choices, thereby facilitating political accountability.
123. U.S.C. §§ 4321 - 4347 (2000).
124. F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 1996).
125. Id. at 169.
126. Id. at 171.
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b. Making the Views of Scientists Public
Requiring that the unvarnished views of agency scientists or advisory
panels, as well as the final agency decision, be publicly accessible would
also significantly increase transparency and accountability. Conservation-
ists have always assumed, or at least hoped, that science mandates would
strengthen the hand of conservation scientists in natural resource regulation.
In practice, this effect has been limited because control of agency decisions
ultimately rests with political appointees, who have proven quite willing to
reject the recommendations of agency scientists. They can frequently do so
with political impunity because the public lacks access to those recommen-
dations unless they are leaked to the press.
Currently, agency scientific recommendations may not even be discover-
able in litigation. Some courts have ruled that they are covered by the delib-
erative process privilege, 127 which protects internal pre-decision discussions
in order to allow agencies to engage in frank and complete consideration of
the decision. Ideally, Congress would mandate public disclosure of the
recommendations or reports of agency scientists. It would be simple
enough to require that agency biologists make their drafts public, and that
supervisors who make or require changes in the original analysis publicly
acknowledge and explain those changes. Failing congressional action,
courts could exclude such recommendations or reports from the deliberative
process privilege. Where Congress has directed agencies to use the best
available scientific information in their decisions, the public is entitled to
know what agency scientists think of the scientific data, without filtering by
political appointees.
That does not mean that agency scientists must always control the ulti-
mate decisions, or even that they can necessarily be trusted to avoid mixing
policy judgments with their scientific evaluations. Scientific judgments are
most likely to be accurate if they are made by scientists with both broad
experience in the relevant field and specific knowledge of the correspond-
ing system or species. But, as explained above, scientific judgments can be
difficult to untangle from policy or management judgments. Delegation of
policy judgments to agency scientists can be defended as a necessary coun-
terweight to development pressures from mission-oriented agencies and
financial beneficiaries. However, in the end we think that will prove a self-
defeating proposition. Agencies may find ways to select for scientists who
fall on the less conservation-oriented, or at least on the less activist side of
the political spectrum. Alternatively, supervisors may begin to openly re-
127. Center for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 336 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1161 (D.N.M. 2004); Center
for Biological Diversity v. Norton, No. Civ. 01-409 TUC ACM (D. Ariz. July, 24 2002).
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ject scientific advice because they believe that advice is deliberately
skewed.
128
We suggest that both the scientific and policy advice of agency scientists
should be available to the public. This could be achieved by requiring the
various judgments of agency scientists to be included in the public record,
but also structuring those evaluations to separate scientific from other
judgments. Even if agency scientists are just as inclined as agency politi-
cians to hide their political judgments, and just as skilled at doing so, man-
dating public release of their advice should help expose those judgments.
Agency decision makers who must disclose internal scientific advice
counter to their ultimate decision will face political and judicial pressures to
explain the discrepancy. That will give them incentives to reveal the policy
judgments both in their ultimate decision and in the recommendations of
their scientists. 129
c. Outside Scientific Review
It is difficult to object to the concept of peer review. Outside review is
widely viewed as a tool for increasing the accuracy of scientific judgments,
and for holding those judgments within accepted professional boundaries.
It is generally a prerequisite for publishing results in scientific journals.
The Supreme Court has endorsed its role in assuring scientific credibility.
30
Reformers, particularly those from the anti-regulatory camp, have focused
on requiring peer review of highly technical regulatory decisions.'
3
'
The journal model of peer review, however, is not an effective method of
constraining regulatory judgments within the broad sideboards already es-
tablished by judicial review under the APA's arbitrary or capricious stan-
dard. Journals typically send a submitted paper to several experts in the
field. Reviewers evaluate the paper's quality on the basis of the methods
used to collect data, statistical analyses, whether prior studies have been
appropriately acknowledged, and whether claims based on the data fall
within professional boundaries. Journal-style peer review is routinely
128. Eagle & Thompson, supra n. 109, at 669, provide data suggesting just such an effect when
fishery science advisors consciottsly reduced their estimates of allowable catch in an effort to combat
the tendency of managers to set regulatory targets too high.
129. These documents must be practically, as well as legally accessible. In their evaluation of
fisheries regulation, Eagle and Thompson noted how difficult it was for them to find and dig out of the
extensive record the advice of NOAA's Fishery Science Centers and regional council advisory commit-
tees on appropriate quotas. They suggested that the practical unavailability of that information might
contribute to the willingness of the regional councils to ignore scientific advice. Id. at 676.
130. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
131. These calls for peer review often betray their antiregulatory leanings through their asymmetric
structure. The Sound Scieice and Endangered Species Act Planning Act, HR 1662,
http://walden.house.gov/issues/esa/108thcongress/108thcongressbill1662.pdf (accessed May. 18, 2005),
for example, which emerged from the House Resources Committee in the 108th Congress but never
made it to floor action, would have required peer review of decisions to add a species to the protected
list after review, but not of decisions not to list a species, and of jeopardy but not of no-jeopardy consul-
tation decisions.
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sought on ESA listing decisions, critical habitat designations, and recovery
plans.132  It almost never finds flaws in the agency action.' 33  This is not
surprising. Journal-style peer review is designed to keep scientific judg-
ments within very broad professional boundaries. The threat of judicial
review and professional norms together already provide sufficient incen-
tives to keep agencies within those broad boundaries; journal-style peer
review adds very little to the equation.
134
Appropriate outside review which generates a publicly available report
can, however, make scientific, political, and even management judgments
more transparent. Journal-style review is not the best model for this pur-
pose. Review by a committee with the ability to interact with the decision
makers and other interested persons would be more effective. Committee,
rather than individual, review allows representation of diverse disciplines,
and discussion among reviewers from various perspectives. A multi-
disciplinary committee is far more likely than individual experts in a single
field to uncover and question the policy and management judgments agen-
cies have used to define a problem, and to offer alternative definitions of
the problem with accompanying solutions for public consideration. A re-
view committee will be most effective at increasing transparency if it has
both the opportunity to question decision makers (rather than having to rely
on the written record alone), and the authority to compel responses. Of
course, committee review is a resource-intensive step; it should be used
only where the levels of controversy and of uncertainty justify it.13
5
The NRC's Klamath committee illustrates the benefits of a committee
approach to review. Had the biological opinions been sent out by the
agency for peer review, they would almost certainly have been sent to two
or three experts in fish conservation, or perhaps in population viability. The
132. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of inieragency Cooperative Policy for
Peer Review in Endangered Species Act Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 34270 (July 1, 1994). The wildlife
agencies apply this policy to critical habitat designations as well as proposals to add species to the
protected lists.
133. Endangered Species: Fish and Wildlife Service Uses Best Available Science to Make Listing
Decisions, But Additional Guidance Needed for Critical Habitat Designations, supra. n. 101, 21-22.
134. In 2000, Congress postponed a substantive response to calls to reform the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers by directing the National Academy of Sciences to undertake a study of the efficacy of inde-
pendent peer review of Corps feasibility reports on proposed water projects. The resulting study, Natil.
Research Council, Review Procedures for Water Resources Project Planning (Natl. Academy Press
2002), provides a thoughtful analysis of the need for new forms of independent review of science-based
judgments.
135. It is difficult to prescribe blanket rules for the appropriate use of intensive committee-style peer
review. Perhaps the current practice of seeking NRC review when a decision is sufficiently controver-
sial to need the added credibility that review can provide is as good a method as any other. J.B. Ruhl
has tried to explore in more detail and on a more general level the question of when the betefits of any
kind of peer review of ESA regulatory decisions will outweigh its costs. J.B. Ruhl, Prescribing the
Right Dose of Peer Review for the Endangered Species Act, 83 Neb. L. Rev. 398 (2005). He suggests
peer review of decisions with very high economic costs (exceeding $100,000,000) and some random
samples of other decisions. We would add that high-intensity peer review is appropriate only if the
decision is characterized by a high level of uncertainty.
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NRC committee included not only experts in these areas, but also a lim-
nologist, a resource economist, a forest biologist, a consulting engineer, a
geomorphologist, a law professor, and others. 136 That make-up both quali-
fied the committee to take a broad look at the system and virtually guaran-
teed that it would do so. The chairman of the Klamath committee had ex-
tensive experience with the review of politically-charged government re-
search. 137 The committee's final report documented a variety of actions,
both past and present, within the Klamath watershed that have contributed
to the decline of the listed species, and a similar range of steps that might
help move those species toward recovery. It is highly unlikely that individ-
ual peer reviewers, no matter how dedicated, would have brought such a
broad view of the problem to their task.
Effective outside reviews can also spur learning, by inspiring new think-
ing, demanding accountability, and highlighting gaps in the existing data
base that could be filled. That seems to be one positive outcome of the
Klamath NRC review. The committee's final report included a detailed set
of recommendations for research and monitoring. 13 8 The report triggered,
for the first time, meetings focusing on the science of the upper and lower
basin (unfortunately so far only separately). It remains to be seen whether
sufficient resources will be devoted to these efforts, and what new informa-
tion they will produce. In any event, the NRC Klamath report increased
awareness of important unanswered questions.
Review committees can either be ad hoc, as is typical of those regularly
convened by the National Research Council, or long-term, like the review
committees used by the CALFED Bay-Delta Authority. 39 Where regula-
tory decisions are examined repeatedly over a period of years, a standing
committee can better ensure that the agency does not fall into the same mis-
takes year after year. A standing committee, with the benefit of repeated
meetings, may also have the opportunity to become better educated itself
about the system over time, and to refine its interpersonal operations. On
the other hand, it may be difficult to get experts to make the multi-year
commitment necessary for a standing committee. Over time, members of a
standing committee also may become undesirably close to the regulators (or
their appointing bodies) whose actions they are supposed to be overseeing.
136. See Final NRC Report, supra n. 31, at 381-84 (brief biographies of the committee members).
137. Professor William Lewis, who chaired the Klamath committee, had earlier chaired the NRC's
Committee to Review the Glen Canyon Environmental Studies. That committee was charged with
overseeing, over the course of nearly 10 years, the Bureau of Reclamation's study of the potential ef-
fects of changes in the operation of the Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River ecosystem and endan-
gered fish species downstream. See Nati. Research Council, River Resource Management in the Grand
Canyon (Natil. Acad. Press 1996). The committee's work helped convince the Bureau to consider peri-
odic flushing flows or "controlled floods" as ecosystem restoration measures.
138. Final NRC Report, supra n. 31 at 345-50.
139. See California Bay-Delta Authority, ISB, http:llwww.science.calwater.ca.gov/
sci toolslisb.shtmlhttp://www.science.calwater.ca.gov/scitoolslisb.shtl (accessed Jan. 29, 2005)
(describing CALFED's Independent Science Board, a standing multi-disciplinary review body).
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While they can be very useful in highlighting the judgments made by
regulators, outside reviews can themselves serve to hide the policy judg-
ments of the reviewers if not carefully performed and presented. Review
committees should not simply be invited to critique an agency decision.
They should be asked instead to: evaluate the degree of scientific support
for a particular decision; identify gaps or weaknesses in the available data;
highlight what interpretive judgments were made and how the agency dealt
with uncertainty; quantify, at least roughly, the likelihood of errors associ-
ated with too much or too little regulation; and consider what value addi-
tional data would carry for the regulatory decision. Explicitly charging the
review committee with revealing policy judgments made in the course of
the regulatory process should discourage the committee from simply substi-
tuting its own policy views for those of the regulatory agency under the
guise of scientific review. It could also help avoid mischaracterization and
misunderstanding of the review. The most troubling aspect of the Klamath
NRC review was the way the committee's interim report was portrayed as
showing that the regulatory agencies had engaged in "junk science." Had
the committee been more conscious of distinctly separating its review of the
scientific support for the regulatory decisions from review of the decision
itself, its interim report might have been less vulnerable to such misuse.
It is also important that outside review not turn into a fly-specking exer-
cise. No decision is perfect, especially when made in the face of limited
information. Outside reviews by "hired guns" often devolve into exercises
in identifying every small criticism to which the decision might be subject,
even if those flaws had no discernible impact on the decision. Regulatory
decisions, because of the notice and comment procedure prescribed by the
APA, are always subject to that kind of review if there is an interested party
with the resources to finance it. When submitted as mere comments on a
rule making, those criticisms do not carry the authority of an independent
scientific review. In committee review, however, interested parties can
bury the committee with those sorts of criticisms, hoping to overwhelm the
committee into adopting their agenda. 140 The review will be most useful if
committee members are both capable of viewing the decision at a broad
level, and inclined to do so. The committee charge can help to insure that
attitude, but it is also important that committee members be selected not
only for their independence and specific expertise but also to some extent
for their ability to see the larger picture. We believe the NRC selection
process seeks that quality, although it is not infallible.
Finally, outside reviews may by their very nature carry more credibility
than they deserve. Outside reviewers may be expert in fields implicated by
140. Professor Doremus experienced this kind of trivial data overload as a member of an NRC
committee reviewing ESA decisions in the Platte River basin. A consulting firm hired by water users
sought to overwhelm the committee with detailed, but ultimately unimportant, criticisms of the regula-
tory agency's conclusions about the Platte's channel dynamics.
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a regulatory decision, but they will frequently be relative newcomers to the
details of the particular system. While they can provide a valuable perspec-
tive, they might easily miss or misunderstand important details. Just as the
authors of journal articles have the opportunity to respond to negative re-
views, regulatory agencies should have the opportunity to respond to exter-
nal reviews. Reviews of regulatory decisions should move the conversation
forward, not automatically supply the final word.
3. Strengthening the Institutional Role of Science
We also believe that agencies can be structured to strengthen the institu-
tional role of science, not merely that of conservation-minded scientists.
The CALFED Bay-Delta program has made a deliberate effort to do just
that. The key elements are a science program independent of any regula-
tory function, led by a strong director with impeccable scientific credential,
and standing advisory panels of outside experts who regularly interact both
with the science program and with the agency's regulatory arms. Strong
and credible agency science, aided by committed outside reviewers, can
increase the accuracy and transparency of agency regulatory decisions, as
well as generate the added bonus of promoting effective and efficient learn-
ing, which will more closely constrain scientific judgments over time.
The CALFED experience also shows the difficulty of making that struc-
ture effective over the long run. Substantial resources must be devoted to
the scientific enterprise; just as CALFED has struggled overall to maintain
sufficient funding, the Science Program has struggled to obtain the re-
sources promised in the original Record of Decision. The political benefits
of spending on research will often be less attractive than spending on "pork-
barrel" restoration projects whose effectiveness is never subjected to close
scrutiny. Furthermore, outside review by CALFED's standing panels is
hard work. The most recent report by the Environmental Water Account
panel reveals the frustrations of the reviewers with their inability to control
the review agenda, which has left much of their time at the mercy of agency
presentations that can be more self-serving than informative. 141 In order to
be most effective, outside review panels should themselves control the
agenda of presentations (as NRC panels do), should be involved in the as-
sembly of review materials prior to their meetings, and should be supported
by an agency supervisor with the authority to demand that their recommen-
dations be followed.
141. See 2004 EWA Review Panel, Review of the 2003-04 Environmental Water Account (EWA),
http://science.calwater.ca.gov/pdf/ewa/EWA technicathttp://science.calwater.ca.gov/pdf/ewa/EwA-tec
hnicalreviewfinal_011705.pdf (Jan. 17, 2005). Professor Doremus served on the CALFED EWA
review panel for three years, until she concluded that the committee's limited impact on agency attitudes
and actions did not justify the time and effort its members were expending.
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V. CONCLUSION
Science is a necessary element of natural resource management deci-
sions, but it is rarely decisive. The available scientific information is hardly
ever sufficient to objectively determine those decisions. Substantial doses
of judgment are needed to interpret incomplete information, identify ele-
ments of the regulated system most likely to respond to management inter-
vention, and clarify the goals of regulation. Those judgments simply can-
not be removed from the equation, and in most cases they, rather than the
underlying data, are determinative. Rather than demanding perfectly ra-
tional regulatory decisions, those seeking reform of regulation (from either
side of the political spectrum) would be better served by a closer examina-
tion of the judgments that go into regulatory decisions.
Those critical judgments are only very loosely constrained, allowing the
regulatory agencies substantial discretion to exercise their biases and policy
preferences. The extent of the range of judgments allowed by existing leg-
islation and regulation is strikingly illustrated by the ability of the Bush
administration to halt and reverse many Clinton administration conservation
efforts. 42 Courts and the conventional political process have not been very
effective in overseeing these regulatory judgments, in large part because the
technical nature of the decisions allows many of them to be hidden. Unre-
alistic demands for perfect scientific, objective decision making will only
exacerbate this problem by driving judgments further underground.
Congress could act to more closely constrain agency regulatory judg-
ments, but is not likely to do so. We suggest that any steps that either make
the variety of judgments that go into these decisions more transparent or
encourage focused acquisition of relevant data will help put sideboards on
agency judgments, making it more likely that society's substantive conser-
vation goals will be met. Courts could help force regulatory judgments into
the open through conscious application of existing hard-look review. Peer
review by independent experts, appropriately conducted, can both expose
regulatory judgments and encourage learning. Institutional structures that
encourage agencies to focus on what they do and do not know about the
systems they regulate can also have a role.
Because judgments will always be an important part of natural resource
management, we believe the institutions responsible for management and
regulation should be consciously designed and evaluated with an eye to the
effect of agency structure on those judgments. It clearly matters how deci-
sion making authority is divided between agencies with conservation mis-
sions and those with extractive or development missions. It matters
whether and how the extent of uncertainty in the information supporting
regulation is made apparent to the political community. It matters whether
142. See generally John D. Leshy, Natural Resources Policy in the Bush (11) Administration: An
Outsider's Somewhat Jaundiced Assessment, 14 Duke Envtl. L. & Policy Forum 347, 352-54 (2004).
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regulatory decisions are subject to outside review, by whom, and how that
review is structured. All of these institutional factors, and others, matter
not because they will facilitate or impede perfect scientific decision mak-
ing, but because they will inevitably affect the way judgments are made.
The debate over natural resource management and regulation needs to be
expanded beyond the futile search for perfect rationality to encompass a
more realistic discussion of how to make the best possible decisions in an
inevitably imperfect world.

